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Within the debate about the epistemology of aesthetic appreciation, it has a long tradition, 
and is still very common, to endorse the sentimentalist view that our aesthetic evaluations are 
rationally  grounded on,  or  even constituted by,  certain of  our  emotional  responses to the 
objects concerned. Such a view faces, however, the serious challenge to satisfactorily deal 
with  the  seeming  possibility  of  faultless  disagreement  among  emotionally  based  and 
epistemically appropriate verdicts. I will argue that the sentimentalist approach to aesthetic 
epistemology cannot accept and accommodate this possibility without thereby undermining 
the assumed capacity  of  emotions to  justify  corresponding aesthetic  evaluations -  that  is, 
without undermining the very sentimentalist idea at the core of its account. And I will also try 
to show that sentimentalists can hope to deny the possibility of faultless disagreement only by 
giving up the further view that aesthetic assessments are intersubjective - a view which is 
almost as traditional and widely held in aesthetics as sentimentalism, and which is indeed 
often enough combined with the latter. My ultimate conclusion is therefore that this popular 
combination of views should better be avoided: either sentimentalism or intersubjectivism has 
to make way.
Introduction
1.  Emotions  can  possibly  stand  in  two  kinds  of  rational  relations:  they  can  be 
supported by reasons, such as judgements or facts concerned with the non-evaluative 
nature of objects; and they can themselves provide reasons, for instance for belief or 
action. My main concern in this essay is with a certain aspect of the latter, namely the 
capacity (or lack thereof) of emotions or sentiments to epistemically justify aesthetic 
evaluations,  that  is,  ascriptions  of  aesthetic  values  to  objects.  That  is,  I  will  be 
concerned  with  epistemological  issues  concerning  the  idea  of  emotion-based 
aesthetic evaluations. Only in passing will I say also something about the rational 
underpinning of our emotional responses themselves.
The view that certain of our emotional responses indeed possess the capacity to 
justify aesthetic evaluations, and that our aesthetic assessments are primarily, if not 
always, epistemically based on or constituted by these responses, has become almost 
orthodoxy in aesthetics, or at least the predominant approach to the epistemology of 
aesthetic evaluations.1 Moreover, this view is very often combined with the further 
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1 Cf.,  for  instance,  the  sentimentalist  theories  put  forward  in  Hume  1998,  Kant  1990, 
sections 1ff.,  Budd 1995, 11ff.  and 38f.,  Goldman 1995, 22, and the semi-sentimentalist 
view proposed in Levinson 1995.  One notable exception is  Bender 1995 who construes 
aesthetic evaluations instead as inferentially based. As it has been suggested to me by an 
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view that all our aesthetic evaluations are intersubjective, in the rough sense that at 
least neither their truth-values, nor the exemplifications of the ascribed values are 
relativised to specific human subjects or groups.2 I will label the first of these two 
views about aesthetic evaluations sentimentalism, and the second intersubjectivism.3 
Contrary  to  the  still  strong  and  influential  tendency  in  aesthetics  to  combine 
sentimentalism and intersubjectivism, I aim to show that the two views should not be 
endorsed simultaneously. That is, in my view, sentimentalism should be upheld only if 
intersubjectivism  is  rejected;  and  intersubjectivism  should  be  upheld  only  if 
sentimentalism  is  rejected.  Given  that  I  furthermore  take  the  denial  of 
intersubjectivism to be highly implausible (although I do not intend to argue for this 
here4), I believe that, ultimately, it is sentimentalism concerning aesthetic evaluations 
which should give way.5
Here is how I will proceed. First of all, I will spell out the main elements of the 
sentimentalist  and  the  intersubjectivist  approaches  to  aesthetic  appreciation  (cf. 
sections 2-7). Then, I will formulate a challenge to this approach, which arises out of 
what is usually described as the seeming possibility of faultless disagreement among 
our emotional responses and the related aesthetic evaluations (cf. section 8). After 
this, I will discuss and reject the various strategies which a sentimentalist may adopt 
in order to be able to accept and accommodate this possibility (cf. sections 9-17). And 
anonymous referee, adopting a sentimentalist outlook may perhaps be plausible only with 
respect to certain kinds of aesthetic value (e.g., concerning the funny, or the disgusting). If 
so, my discussion may have to be similarly restricted in its scope (and my notion of an 
'overall aesthetic merit' of a work to be understood as denoting the most comprehensive 
and non-descriptive aesthetic value said to be accessible by means of emotions).
2 Cf. Hume 1998, Kant 1990, McDowell 1983, Budd 1995, ch. 1, and 1999, and presumably 
Levinson,  who believes that  "pleasure that  testifies  to  artistic  value must  go beyond a 
single encounter, must be experiencable by others, and at other times" (Levinson 1995, 13; 
cf. also 16).
3 Of course,  both notions may be understood in many other ways.  In particular,  a wider 
notion of sentimentalism may be used to characterize the dependence of our evaluations or 
evaluative  concepts  on  our  emotional  capacities  in  more  general  terms  (cf.  D'Arms  & 
Jacobson 2003, 127f.); while a narrower notion may be limited to the view that aesthetic 
judgements are about or express sentiments, rather than facts,  and are not (genuinely) 
cognitive or truth-apt (cf. Zangwill 2001, 149ff.). By contrast, my notion focusses on the 
epistemic link between emotions and evaluations (i.e.,  on the idea that the former can 
justify the latter by either grounding or constituting them) and is meant to include also 
positions which take aesthetic judgements to be truth-apt despite their being epistemically 
based on emotional responses.
4 Cf.  e.g.,  Hume  1998,  Kant  1990  and  Wollheim  1980  for  powerful  criticisms  of  more 
subjectivist approaches to aesthetic epistemology.
5 Despite my exclusive focus on the aesthetic case, I hope that the following considerations 
on the possible epistemic relationship between emotions and evaluations do not depend on 
idiosyncrasies  of  the  aesthetic  debate  or  its  subject  matter  and  are  therefore  also 
applicable to other kinds of value. In particular, I hope that the arguments presented here 
put pressure on the views of the  few moral epistemologists - Wiggins 1987b and Döring 
2007 prominently among them - who take emotions or sentiments to be justifying grounds 
or constituents of evaluations.
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finally,  I  will  try  to undermine any plausible sentimentalist  attempt to deny it  (cf. 
sections 18-20). As a result, I will conclude that sentimentalism is forced to give up 
intersubjectivism.
Sentimentalism
2. Sentimentalism, as understood here, is the epistemological view that certain of our 
sentiments or emotional responses can - and, indeed, often do - justify our aesthetic 
evaluations. The underlying idea is that our aesthetic assessments are typically based 
on,  or  constituted by,  the relevant  emotions,  and that  the appropriateness of  the 
latter  transfers  to  the  former.  This  implies  that  there  are  strict  correspondances 
between (sets of) emotional responses and aesthetic values (or ascriptions thereof), 
which means at least that each kind of aesthetic value is uniquely linked to a certain 
type of  emotional  response.  For  instance,  the  particular  aesthetic  merit  of  being 
exciting may be said to correspond to feelings of excitement; or, more generally, the 
value of being aesthetically good to feelings of pleasure. But it may also mean that 
differences in degree among the values parallel differences in intensity among the 
emotional  responses.  Sentimentalism  is  compatible  with  a  wide  variety  of  more 
concrete  views  about  the  nature  of  aesthetic  appreciation.  For  instance, 
sentimentalist may take aesthetic evaluations to consist in, or to express, emotional 
responses.6 But they may equally take them to be based on emotions in a similar way, 
in  which  perceptual  judgements  are  based  on  perceptions,  or  introspective 
judgements on the respective first-order states.7 
3.  Among  the  main  motivations  for  sentimentalism  is  the  observation  that  our 
respective emotional responses are rationally sensitive to evidence for aesthetic (or 
other kinds of) worth. When we try to explain why we value certain artworks, or try 
to convince someone else of our appraisal, we usually point to certain non-evaluative 
facts about the object - for instance, how it looks or sounds, which story it tells, and 
how, who created it,  and when, and so on (cf.  Goldman 1995, 12ff.,  and Zangwill 
6 Examples are Goldman 1995, e.g., 22, and the aesthetic theories - such as those discussed 
by Hopkins  2001 and  Todd 2004 -  which are in  the spirit  of  Blackburn's  or  Gibbard's 
versions of moral expressivism. The account put forward by Hume 1998, and perhaps also 
that of Kant 1990, appear to involve similar ideas.
7 The theory defended by McDowell 1983 and 1985, as well as aesthetic positions in the 
wake of the moral accounts of Wiggins 1987b and Wright 1988, are of this kind. Note that 
also  Kant  stresses  that  aesthetic  judgements  are  primarily  about  the  subject's  own 
emotions, and only then about the experienced objects (Kant 1990, 3f.).
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2001, 20ff. and 37ff.). But these and similar facts are also among those which are 
relevant for the occurrence and nature of our emotional responses. When we hear 
that the painting, which we took to be rather original for the Romantic period in its 
dispassionate  objectiveness  stems  in  fact  from  the  late  Nineteenth  Century,  our 
excitement about it will wane. And our admiration for a piece of music may well be 
heightened by the recognition of its intricate and original structure. The impact of 
the respective non-evaluative facts on our emotional responses is thereby evidently 
rational in nature. For both the occurrence and the adequacy of our emotions is at 
least partly a matter of the contents of our mental representations of these facts (cf. 
Goldie  2004).  For  example,  feeling  awed  when  confronted  with  a  certain  poem, 
despite taking it to be unoriginal, bland, uninteresting in its content and stylistically 
flawed in many ways, would not be the right kind of emotional response to that piece 
of writing, at least not within the context of an aesthetic experience of the poem. This 
provides  support  for  the  sentimentalist  view  that  emotions  mediate  rationally 
between our non-evaluative experiences of objects and our aesthetic evaluations of 
them. For it can elucidate why and how our assessments are responsive to and based 
on relevant reasons, that is, on relevant non-evaluative facts about the objects to be 
evaluated.8
The idea of reflection
4.  Sentimentalism  is  often  combined  with  two  other  ideas:  that  (some  of)  our 
8 Other  important motivations  for  sentimentalism  are:  (i):  the  particularist  insight  that 
aesthetic  assessment  is  typically not the matter of  deductive inference on the basis of 
judgements about  non-aesthetic  features (cf.  Kant 1985,  section 56,  Sibley 1965,  Budd 
1999, Goldman 1995, 132ff., and Bender 1995); (ii) the fact that sentimentalism promises 
to  explain  certain  aspects  of  the  central  role  and  importance  of  emotions  in  aesthetic 
evaluation, such as the intimate link between aesthetic values and emotional terms (e.g., 
'exciting',  'wonderful',  'stimulating',  'awesome',  'moving',  'disgusting',  'appalling'  or 
'outrageous'; cf.  Williams 1965, 218f.,  and McNaughton 1988, 8), or the function of the 
emotional responses to draw our attention to reasons for aesthetic assessment; and (iii) 
perhaps also the seeming subjectivity of our aesthetic assessments.
However, none of these points compel one to accept sentimentalism. Although they may 
provide considerable support for this approach to aesthetic appreciation, there is still room 
for alternative theories fitting or explaining the noted facts as well as sentimentalism. In 
particular, a more rationalist view can hope to be on equal standing with sentimentalism 
with respect to the considerations commonly put forward in favour of the latter. According 
to such a view, aesthetic assessment is a matter of true or false judgements about the 
aesthetic merit of objects, made on the basis of inductive considerations and inferences to 
the best  explanation concerning the non-aesthetic  features of  those objects (cf.  Bender 
1995). And it can assign to emotional responses the role of merely drawing our attention to 
(already independently recognized) reasons for aesthetic assessment, rather than that of 
grounding or constituting such evaluations.
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aesthetic evaluations (as well as any corresponding emotional responses) have the 
capacity to reflect the aesthetic worth of objects; and that our aesthetic evaluations 
are either appropriate or inappropriate, and possibly in more than one way.
An evaluation reflects a certain value of an object just in case the object exemplifies 
the value which the evaluation ascribes to him. Perhaps all our aesthetic evaluations 
reflect  actual  instances  of  aesthetic  value;  or  perhaps  only  those  which  are 
appropriate or fitting (as I will say). The idea of reflection is not very strong and 
should be uncontroversial.  It is rather weak because the notion of having a value 
which it invokes is used in such a way as not to entail any strong metaphysical or 
other  commitments,  apart  from  the  presupposition  that  talking  of  the  values  of 
objects is legitimate in some sense or another. Indeed, it should be compatible even 
with eliminativist positions or error theories which deny that there actually are any 
exemplifications  of  aesthetic  values,  but  which  nonetheless  accept  that  it  makes 
sense to speak of the aesthetic worth of objects and provide a satisfactory theory of 
such talk. Furthermore, the idea of reflection is rather weak also because the notions 
of reflecting and, if applicable, of fitting evaluations may likewise be understood in a 
very non-committal way. While it may be proposed that aesthetic responses reflect 
instances of aesthetic worth by cognizing them, it may also be proposed that they 
reflect  exemplifications  of  aesthetic  values  simply  by  projecting  them  onto  their 
bearers. All that the idea of reflection presupposes is that objects have values, and 
that  there  is  some  kind  of  correspondance  between  these  values  and  those 
evaluations (and, perhaps, those emotional responses) which ascribe or assign them - 
again perhaps in a rather loose sense which does not require, say, the involvement of 
respective concepts - to the objects. It is therefore not very demanding or costly to 
endorse the idea of reflection. On the contrary, it would seem to be highly implausible 
to reject it, given that this would mean having to to stop talking of objects as bearers 
of values, and of evaluations as representing and potentially reflecting these values.
Epistemic appropriateness and fittingness
5. According to the idea of appropriateness, on the other hand, some evaluations are 
better than others; and the former are to be preferred over the latter - say, in respect 
to the issue of which we should endorse. For example, the claim that  Hamlet is a 
masterpiece is said to be more adequate than the claim that it is a mediocre play. And 
we should thus hold on to the former and give up the latter. Evaluations may be taken 
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to be better or worse than others in basically two ways: in relation to their epistemic 
standing, that is, their justification; and in relation to their reflecting the values of 
their objects. To return to the example, the first claim about  Hamlet may be better 
than the second because it has been made in the right way, or because it reflects 
better the actual worth of the play. To distinguish the two senses in which evaluations 
may  differ  in  appropriateness,  I  will  differentiate  between  the  epistemic 
appropriateness and the fittingness of assessments.
The idea of  an epistemic appropriateness of  aesthetic  evaluations expresses the 
view that such assessments are either justified or unjustified, namely in the light of 
the relevant reasons available to us and, in particular,  with respect to the aim of 
getting access  to  the aesthetic  values  of  objects.  The  idea  is  often  linked to the 
postulation  of  suitable  conditions  which  suffice  to  ensure  such  an  adequacy  in 
appreciation (cf. Hume 1998, Levinson 1995, 15ff., and Goldman 1995, 21f.; cf. also, 
more generally, Wright 1988 and 1992). Which conditions are suitable in this respect 
may perhaps differ  from case to case,  depending on, say,  the particular subjects, 
objects  or  aesthetic  values  concerned.  But  the  conditions  will  surely  put  certain 
demands  on  the  evaluating  subjects,  and  perhaps  also  on  the  environmental 
circumstances. Accordingly, it is often required that subjects are fully and correctly 
aware of  all  the relevant  features or  acts  concerning the object  to  be evaluated, 
which  again  presupposes  that  they  are  sufficiently  attentive,  sensitive  and 
experienced in these matters; and that their further consideration of these features 
or facts happens in a rational and impartial way, and with no cognitive fault involved 
(cf. Hume 1998, Kant 1990, sections 2ff.,  Goldman 1995, 21f.,  and Zangwill 2001, 
152ff.). And the satisfaction of such conditions may furthermore require, say, that the 
right kinds of interaction with the object are possible or permitted, or that the right 
kinds  of  observational  conditions  obtain.  In  the  context  of  sentimentalism,  any 
assumed epistemic justification of evaluations will be a matter of the standing of the 
relevant emotional responses and of their relationship to the assessments. Hence, if 
the emotional responses occur under suitable conditions, they acquire the power to 
justify corresponding evaluations; and if they then indeed lead to such assessments, 
they actually render them justified.
The idea of fittingness, on the other hand, becomes relevant for the identification of 
those evaluations which actually reflect the aesthetic worth of objects. Assuming that 
there is this form of appropriateness in aesthetic evaluation amounts to maintaining 
that not all  assessments are equal in their reflection of aesthetic merit,  and that, 
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more precisely, only fitting evaluations correspond to instances of aesthetic values.9 
Fittingness may then be spelled out in terms of truth; but it may also be spelled out in 
terms  of  some  other  kind  of  appropriateness,  such  as  some  form  of  emotional 
adequacy which does not amount to truth, while perhaps being very similar to truth.10
6. Proponents of sentimentalism, who accept that our aesthetic evaluations can be 
appropriate or inappropriate in one or more ways, may differ on how they conceive of 
the  relevant  kinds  of  appropriateness  (i.e.,  epistemic  appropriateness  and 
fittingness), as well as their relationship. But there is much agreement on the idea 
that epistemic appropriateness is either conducive to or constitutive of fittingness. 
Many  theories  accept  the  truth-aptness  of  evaluations  and,  correspondingly, 
understand  fittingness  in  terms  of  truth.  And  although  they  may  differ  in  their 
interpretation  of  the  nature  of  the  truth  involved  and  of  its  link  to  epistemic 
appropriateness, they all assume that the latter is likely to, or even does, ensure the 
former.11 Indeed, it would be highly implausible to endorse an epistemological theory 
which takes truth and epistemic appropriateness to be more independent of each 
other. On such a view, the acquisition of true - rather than false - evaluations would 
be  an  arbitrary  matter  beyond  our  control.  Given  that  striving  for  justified 
assessments would not be more likely to guarantee truth than striving for unjustified 
assessments,  the  respective  criteria  for  epistemic  appropriateness  (e.g.,  full 
information, unbiasedness, attentiveness, etc.) could not guide us any more in the 
aim to  discover  the  true  aesthetic  values  of  objects.  And the  resulting  cognitive 
irrelevance of these criteria would raise the question of why we should care at all 
about epistemic appropriateness and about the related justificatory potential of our 
respective emotional responses.
However, there are also theories which deny the truth-aptness of aesthetic verdicts 
9 D'Arms and Jacobson 2000 make a very similar use of the notion of fittingness with respect 
to emotions and their accurate presentation of some of their target's evaluative features. 
10Cf. the discussions in de Sousa 2002 and 2007, and in Morton 2002; and cf. also the notion 
of appropriate expressions in Gibbard 1990).
11Some accounts  of  this  kind  assume that  evaluations  are  (substantially)  true  when and 
because they successfully track instances of values which are there, as genuine parts of the 
world, to be recognized by us (cf. McDowell 1983 and 1985, and Wiggins 1987b). Other 
accounts take evaluations to be (presumably less substantially) true when and because they 
determine, rather than recognize, which objects have which values (cf. Wright 1988 and 
Goldman 1995).  The idea is  that it  is  our epistemically best  opinions which reflect  the 
aesthetic worth of objects and, hence, should count as true (cf. Wright 1988 and 1992). 
Besides, both kinds of view may vary in whether they take our epistemically appropriate 
evaluations to partly constitute the aesthetic values of the objects in question, or merely to 
pick them - or the respective underlying features of the objects constituting them - out (cf. 
McFarland & Miller 1998 for the difference). McDowell, Wiggins and perhaps also Wright 
seem to favour the constitutionist alternative, while Goldman may be read as opting for the 
more reductionist view.  
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and instead assume only a single kind of aesthetic appropriateness - for instance, the 
emotional  adequacy  mentioned  above  -  which  fulfils  the  role  of  both  epistemic 
appropriateness  and  fittingness  by  ensuring  single-handedly  that  the  resulting 
assessments count as justified and as reflecting the aesthetic worth of the objects 
concerned.12 For  such  theories,  epistemic  appropriateness  simply  amounts  to 
fittingness. Hence, combining sentimentalism with the idea of appropriateness should 
involve the affirmation of the claim that epistemic appropriateness is conducive to or 
constitutive of fittingness.
Intersubjectivism
7. As already noted, it is very common in aesthetics to combine sentimentalism with 
intersubjectivism. As I understand intersubjectivism, it implies at least two important 
ideas (although it may not simply reduce to them). First, it entails that whether an 
object  in  fact  exemplifies  a particular  aesthetic  value or  not  is  not  relativised to 
certain subjects or groups of subjects among humanity, but equal for all actual or 
possible human beings. This means that objects are beautiful or disgusting for all 
humans (or none), but not, say, beautiful-for-me and disgusting-for-you. And second, 
intersubjectivism entails  that  whether  aesthetic  assessments  reflect  the  aesthetic 
merit of an object or not is not relativised to certain subjects or groups of subjects 
among humanity, but equal for all actual or possible human beings. This means - for 
instance, if reflection and fittingness are spelled out in terms of truth - that aesthetic 
evaluations are true or false for all humans (or none), but not, say, true-for-me and 
false-for-you. By contrast, intersubjectivism does not say anything about non-human 
subjects -  for instance,  whether they have or know of aesthetic values, and if  so, 
whether they share ours.13 Similarly,  intersubjectivism is compatible with the idea 
12The resulting non-truth-apt evaluations are probably best understood in expressivist terms 
(cf. Gibbard 1990). Some expressivists have tried to establish some (non-substantial) notion 
of truth for evaluations (cf. Blackburn 1984 and Todd 2004) and hence align their accounts 
closer to the non-expressivist theories just  mentioned which involve a similar  notion of 
truth. However, this project has come under criticism (cf. Hopkins 2001), in part because a 
notion of truth may not be so easily had (cf. McDowell 1987). Expressivist accounts are 
often combined with the endorsement of some form of projectivism, according to which 
values are not real aspects of the world, but merely figments of our minds which we project 
onto the world (cf. Hume 1998, Blackburn 1984 and, presumably, Kant 1998). Besides, they 
may differ in respect to whether they accept that there are actually exemplifications of 
aesthetic values, or whether they prefer an eliminativist approach or some form of error 
theory concerning these values.
13Cf. Budd 1995, 39f.. The choice of humanity as the hallmark of intersubjectivity is to some 
extent arbitrary.  Perhaps it  would be better  to  understand intersubjectivity in  terms of 
(sufficiently large) cultures or communities - but only if these are specified in terms of 
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that which aesthetic values objects exemplify is determined by, or otherwise depends 
on,  the responses of  only  certain  humans (e.g.,  experts,  ideal  judges,  or subjects 
assessing  objects  under  normal  or  optimal  conditions).  And  it  permits  that  only 
particular humans may have access to certain exemplifications of aesthetic worth.
Intersubjectivism is attractive because it explains in an easy and straightforward 
way why we take differing evaluations to be in conflict,  ask ourselves and others 
involved for reasons for our assessments, enter discussions with them in order to 
come to agreement,  either by trying to convince the others of our opinion, or by 
revising our own verdict,  and so on. We do not treat  our ascriptions of aesthetic 
values differently in these respects than, say, our ascriptions of shapes, wealth, talent 
in basketball, and other evaluative or or non-evaluative properties. Hence, the denial 
of intersubjectivism appears to imply admitting that there is some systematic error, 
or  some misplaced demand on others to  agree with us,  involved in our aesthetic 
assessments.  Of  course,  this  is  far  from  sufficient  to  settle  the  debate  between 
intersubjectivists  and  their  opponents.  But  what  it  illustrates  is  that  giving  up 
intersubjectivism should not be more than a last resort.14 And in response to this fact, 
many sentimentalists - not the least Hume and Kant - have tried to hold on to the 
intersubjectivity  of  aesthetic  evaluations,  at  least  as  much  as  possible.15 In  what 
follows, I would like to consider whether they can hope to succeed in this ambition.
The challenge to sentimentalism
8. As has often been observed (e.g., by Kant 1990, sections 36ff. and 56ff., and by 
Goldman 1995, 28f.), a particular challenge which they are facing is to show how it is 
possible  to  combine  the  idea  of  intersubjective  aesthetic  evaluations  with  the 
linguistic,  geographical  and  similarly  evaluatively  neutral  factors,  and  not  in  terms  of 
shared  aesthetic  sensitivities,  tastes  or  emotional  dispositions,  given  that  this  strategy 
would  otherwise  lead  to  some form of  relativisation.  Similarly,  if  the  relevant  class  of 
subjects  becomes  too  small,  talk  of  'intersubjectivity'  would  have  lost  most  of  its 
significance.
14Even sentimentalists, who, at least to some extent, give up intersubjectivism in the face of 
the possibility of faultless disagreement, note how problematic this move is - for instance, 
because it contradicts our common intersubjectivist intuitions (cf. Goldman 1995, 37f.), or 
because "it may not be possible to establish any sufficient difference in the 'value-focus' of 
those who appear to be in disagreement" (Wiggins 1987b, 209; cf. also Wiggins 1987a, 181) 
for his idea to reject intersubjectivism in certain moral cases).
15For instance, although Hume and Budd seem to allow for relativisation in certain cases - in 
Hume's case to age and culture, and in Budd's to ways of experiencing or understanding 
artworks (or to the underlying sensitivities and dispositions) - they nonetheless hold on to 
the idea that aesthetic evaluations are generally intersubjective (cf. Hume 1998 and Budd 
1995, 42).
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possibility  of  faultless  disagreement,  all  the  while  assuming  a  sentimentalist 
approach to aesthetic appreciation. This challenge may be developed in three steps.
The  first  step  is  the  observation  that  our  emotional  responses  to  artworks  and 
similar  objects  may  differ  -  whether  in  quality  or  intensity,  or  whether  intra-  or 
interpersonally - even under conditions held to be suitable for epistemically adequate 
aesthetic  appreciation.  In  particular,  critics  may  come  up  with  very  different 
emotional reactions to objects, despite being of equally highly attentive and sensitive 
to the relevant marks of aesthetic merit, of similarly sufficient impartiality, expertise 
and  training,  and  so  on.  For  example,  while  one  critic  may  feel  excited  by  Les 
Demoiselles d'Avignon, another may respond with uneasiness, or awe, or nothing of 
the sort.  And it  appears that  there need be no violation of any conditions on the 
epistemic  appropriateness  pertaining  to  aesthetic  evaluations16 and,  hence,  no 
epistemic fault in either emotional response.17 
According  to  the  second  step,  the  sentimentalist  assumption  that  aesthetic 
evaluations  are  grounded  on  or  constituted  by  the  emotional  responses  at  issue 
entails that, if these responses may differ in quality or intensity under the conditions 
ensuring epistemic adequacy in aesthetic assessment, our aesthetic evaluations may, 
too, differ under such conditions, whether in valence or in degree. The idea is that, if 
there  are  two  distinct  emotional  reactions  to  a  certain  object  under  given 
circumstances, and if these responses lead to an aesthetic appraisal of the object, 
there will, as a result, also be two distinct aesthetic evaluations, one for each of the 
corresponding  emotional  responses.  And  given  that  this  applies,  in  particular,  to 
cases in which the appropriateness conditions for aesthetic assessments are satisfied, 
16I assume here that, if aesthetic evaluations are grounded on or constituted by emotional 
responses, the appropriateness conditions for the former include the aesthetically relevant 
appropriateness  conditions  for  the  latter.  That  is,  according  to  sentimentalism,  an 
evaluation is adequate from an aesthetic point of view only if  the respective emotional 
response is as well. It thus is impossible to undermine the possibility of faultless emotions 
by introducing (allegedly) aesthetically relevant suitable conditions for emotions which are 
not  part  of  the  suitable  conditions  for  aesthetic  evaluations.  Of  course,  the  emotional 
responses  involved  may  still  be  subject  to  appropriateness  conditions  which  are 
aesthetically irrelevant (e.g., because they are impractical).  But their inadequacy in this 
respect could not undermine the aesthetic appropriateness of the related evaluations.
17Once it is accepted that there can be different emotional reactions to the same artwork 
(whether under the most suitable conditions or not), another important challenge arises. 
For it is conceivable that the respective critics may come, after extensive discussion and 
further scrutiny, to converge in their aesthetic opinions, without their diverging emotional 
responses disappearing. For instance, the judges of Picasso's painting may very well end up 
agreeing on its status as a masterpiece, despite continuing to emotionally react in different 
ways - say, with feelings of excitement, awe or uneasiness - to their experience of the work. 
Hence,  it  seems  that  there  is  a  problem  for  sentimentalism  not  only  with  cases  of 
disagreement, but also with cases of agreement: convergence in aesthetic assessment does 
not appear to be always due to convergence in emotional disposition or response. However, 
the pursuit of this second challenge to sentimentalism has to await another occasion.
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it  follows  also  that  there  may  be  differing,  but  equally  epistemically  appropriate 
aesthetic evaluations of one and the same object. 
The challenge arises now from adding the third step that such differing evaluations 
may very well be in conflict with each other. Two evaluations stand in conflict with 
each  other  just  in  case  they  assign  incompatible  values  to  the  same  object 
(considered at a specific moment in time). And two values are incompatible just in 
case a single object cannot exemplify both at the same time. Accordingly, assuming 
that  something  cannot  be  both  boring  and  exciting  at  the  same  time,  the  two 
respective assessments are in conflict with each other.18 But as it seems, they may not 
have to differ in their epistemic appropriateness. Similarly,  in  the example about 
Picasso's painting, it may be possible that the diverging emotional responses give rise 
to conflicting aesthetic assessments of the work. For instance, it seems plausible to 
maintain that awe is linked to a different aesthetic value - if not in valence, at least in 
degree -  than uneasiness. And the absence of any relevant emotion in one of the 
critics is presumably related to an altogether different value, or perhaps even to the 
absence of any. The challenge to sentimentalism can then be formulated in terms of 
the demand to show how it can satisfactorily handle the possibility of such cases of 
faultless disagreement -  that is,  of such cases of conflicting aesthetic evaluations, 
none of which needs to be at fault from an epistemic perspective.
If intersubjectivism is given up, this challenge can presumably be met with ease - 
which is one reason why the denial of intersubjectivism may become quite attractive 
for a sentimentalist (cf. Goldman 1995, 26ff.). If objects would really be of different 
aesthetic  merit  for  different  people  -  because,  say,  the  fittingness  of  aesthetic 
assessments,  or  the  exemplification  of  aesthetic  values,  would  be  relativised  to 
distinct groups of human beings - then there would cease to be any genuine conflict 
among  differing  assessments,  since  there  would  be  no  incompatibility  any  more 
between the aesthetic values ascribed by the various critics (and at various times, 
and so on). One and the same work could without a problem be boring-for-me and 
exciting-for-you, or graceful-for-me and insipid-for-you, or a masterpiece-for-me and 
no  masterpiece-for-you;  and one and the  same aesthetic  assessment  (e.g.,  that  a 
given work is beautiful) could equally unproblematically be true-for-me and false-for-
you (assuming that it makes sense to speak of relativised values, exemplifications or 
truth-values).  There might thus be no conflict between aesthetic evaluations, once 
intersubjectivism is given up. 
But  of  course,  the  question  remains  whether  sentimentalist  can  hold  on  to 
18Of course, there may be many other and independent ways in which evaluations or the 
underlying emotions may be in conflict (cf., e.g., de Sousa 2003 and 2007).
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intersubjectivism and still satisfactorily answer the raised challenge. I will argue that 
they cannot; and I will do so by looking in turn at two different strategies: to accept 
the possibility of faultless disagreement and to try to show that it is harmless (cf. 
sections 9-17 below); or, alternatively, to argue that there is no such possibility (cf. 
sections 18-20 below).19
Accepting the possibility of faultless disagreement
9. While Hume, Kant and other sentimentalists have tried to rescue intersubjectivism 
by  making  plausible  that  our  aesthetic  evaluations  and  the  related  emotional 
responses would - at least under suitable conditions - converge (cf. the discussion 
below),  it  has  recently  become  much  more  common  to  accept  the  possibility  of 
faultless disagreement, both in conjunction with and independent of sentimentalism, 
and regarding both aesthetic and other values. A sentimentalist (and, incidentally, 
also a denier of intersubjectivism) in aesthetic matters, who endorses the possibility 
of  conflicting appropriate assessments,  is  Alan Goldman. He claims that  even the 
satisfaction of  the most  ideal  conditions  for  aesthetic  appreciation  cannot  ensure 
sameness in evaluative dispositions and opinions:
[One] cannot explain all disagreement as resulting from deviance from ideal critics 
or from borderline areas of vague terms. Instead, some disagreement reflects the 
fact that differences in taste persist through training and exposure to various art 
forms. (By 'taste' here I refer not only to different preferences but also to different 
judgements of aesthetic worth...). Even ideal critics will disagree in their ascription 
of evaluative aesthetic properties... (Goldman 1995, 36f.)
And  assuming  that  non-evaluative  features  figure  as  supervenience  bases  for 
aesthetic values, he continues to argue that different critics of equally high standard 
may respond to the same set of non-evaluative features of an object by ascribing 
different aesthetic values to the object:
19The  denial  of  the  idea  of  appropriateness  would  not  help  to  answer  the  challenge  to 
sentimentalism. All evaluations would then equally reflect the aesthetic merit of objects 
(i.e., would, in some sense, be equally justified). And since many of them would stand in 
conflict with each other, giving up either intersubjectivism or sentimentalism would be the 
only  options  available.  Indeed,  the  only  hope  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  faultless 
disagreement is to hold on to the appropriateness of aesthetic evaluations and to try to 
show that appropriate assessments converge (cf. the discussion below). 
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A painting with gently curving lines may be graceful to one critic and insipid to 
another. (Goldman 1995, 138)
Likewise,  Wiggins,  who  considers  and  seems  to  tentatively  defend  a  version  of 
sentimentalism concerning moral - and presumably also aesthetic (cf. Wiggins 1987b, 
199) - values, accepts the possibility of disagreements which cannot be resolved on 
the grounds that all but one verdict are inappropriate in some way or another:
In truth, whatever difficulties there are in the possibility of irresoluble substantive 
disagreement,  no position in moral  philosophy can render itself  simply immune 
from them. We should not tumble over ourselves to assert that there is irresoluble 
substantive  disagreement.  We  should  simply  respect  the  possibility  of  such 
disagreement,  I  think,  and  in  respecting  it  register  the  case  for  a  measure  of 
cognitive underdetermination. (Wiggins 1987b, 210)
And finally, Hopkins argues that, if one accepts (as he seems to do himself) a broadly 
sentimentalist approach to aesthetic evaluation, as well as that testimony does not 
provide us with (much) reason to keep or change our own aesthetic assessments, 
then one should also endorse a position which combines the sentimentalist view with 
an embrace of the possibility of conflict among epistemically adequate evaluations. 
For, according to Hopkins, only such a position can hope to explain the assumed fact 
about the relation between testimony and aesthetic appreciation.20 Hence:
So  we  must  abandon  Kantian  orthodoxy  and  allow  that  two  subjects  can  be 
warranted in holding different, but genuinely conflicting, beliefs about something's 
beauty. [...] This is made tolerable by the separateness of the rational subjects in 
question. [...] The crucial notion, I suggest, will be that of a  sensibility, a set of 
dispositions determining one's response, pleasure or otherwise, to the aesthetic 
object. Different subjects may be equally warranted in their conflicting judgements 
of  a  thing's beauty because the pleasure of  each is  in  part  determined by her 
sensibility, and sensibilities differ. (Hopkins 2000, 233)
These different quotations all illustrate a recent tendency to acknowledge, or at least 
to  consider  very  seriously,  the  possibility  of  faultless  disagreement  in  aesthetic 
20But Hopkins is also inclined to hold on to the intersubjectivity of aesthetic evaluations. 
Accordingly, his considerations about the view, which accepts the possibility of faultless 
disagreement in aesthetic matters are not without doubts about its tenability. In particular, 
he notes - but does not give up the hope of finally being able to avoid - the problem that the 
acceptance of this possibility might lead to an account which is in tension with the common 
assumption of the intersubjectivity of aesthetic evaluations (Hopkins 2000, 233 and 235f.).
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matters. And although they do not prove that this possibility really obtains, they add 
at least to the initial plausibility of its assumption.
The impact of the possibility of faultless disagreement
10. But how should or could an intersubjectivist sentimentalist  react if  he indeed 
accepts that  faultless disagreement in aesthetic  matters  is  -  at  least  sometimes - 
possible?  Given  that  he  wants  to  hold  on  to  the  intersubjectivity  of  aesthetic 
evaluations, the most plausible option - as suggested by Budd and others21 - is for him 
to  accept  that  we  should  refrain  from  aesthetic  assessment  if  confronted  with 
concrete cases of conflict among epistemically appropriate evaluations:
If  there  can  be  faultless  differences  in  taste,  both  of  two  opposed  faultless 
aesthetic judgements will be false - in which case someone who is aware of the 
possibility of an opposed faultless response might be wise not to express her own 
response in the corresponding aesthetic judgement. (Budd 1999, 308)
The  underlying  reasoning  is  the  following.  Two  conflicting  evaluations  assign 
different  values to  the same object  of  which it  can exemplify  at  best  one (at  the 
particular time in question). Hence, at best one of the two evaluations can be fitting 
(e.g., true) in the sense of actually reflecting the aesthetic worth which the object 
has. Applying this result to epistemically adequate evaluations, it follows that at least 
one of two epistemically appropriate, but conflicting evaluations has to be non-fitting 
(e.g., false). Furthermore, we cannot tell which of the two assessments is non-fitting, 
and which fitting (if not both are non-fitting). Their epistemic appropriateness cannot 
any more be our guide to their fittingness, given that both are equally sufficiently 
appropriate from an epistemic point of view. And there could not be some additional 
and  so  far  unnoticed  evidence  for  the  fittingness  of  one  evaluation  or  the  non-
fittingness  of  the  other,  for  this  would  mean  that  neither  assessment  would  be 
epistemically adequate due to their violation of the requirement to take into account 
all  relevant  evidence.  Hence,  we  should  refrain  from forcing  a  conclusion  about 
which evaluation is fitting, that is, reflects the actual aesthetic merit of the object in 
question and, therefore, endorse neither of the two assessments. 
Of  course,  we  might  not  be  aware  of  the  possibility  of  a  faultlessly  conflicting 
21Wiggins, for instance, suggests even "[giving] up on the predicate" in this case (Wiggins 
1987b, 209).
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evaluation with respect to one of our concrete actual assessments and, hence, might 
fail to refrain from judgement in such a case. But we would still be rationally required 
to do so. Besides, as Budd notes in the quote, the mere possibility of an appropriate 
alternative  verdict  is  already  sufficient  to  undermine  the epistemic  standing of  a 
given  actual  evaluation.  No  one  needs  to  actually  come  up  with  the  conflicting 
opinion for  it  to  have an impact on the epistemic appropriateness of  the already 
existing assessment.  That  is,  it  is  the possibility  of  faultless  disagreement,  which 
functions as a defeater, and not its actuality.
Wiggins  proposes  another  strategy  to  deal  with  concrete  instances  of  faultless 
disagreement, namely to "remain undeterred" and to "persevere as best as we can in 
the familiar processes of reasoning, conversion, and criticism - without guarantees of 
success, which are almost as needless as they are unobtainable" (Wiggins 1987b, 209 
and 210). But it is not clear what this could mean, apart from ignoring the problem 
and continuing in one's evaluative practices as if there were no possibility of faultless 
disagreement. Success would not only not be guaranteed, it would be impossible. For 
even if some of us were to end up with fitting assessments reflecting the aesthetic 
values of the objects concerned, we would not be able to know this, since we would 
still  not  be  able  to  identify  the  fitting  and  the  non-fitting  evaluations  among  all 
epistemically adequate ones. Also, Wiggins' hope cannot be that, in the end, there 
will be agreement, given that he maintains - in the longer passage quoted further 
above - that we should take the possibility of "irresoluble substantive disagreement" 
serious. Wiggins' proposal might still amount to good practical advice. But it does not 
tell us anything about how to theoretically handle specific cases in which there is the 
possibility of two conflicting appropriate evaluations.
The problem of the ubiquity of possible faultless disagreement
11. Now, if the possibility of faultless disagreement would be widespread (i.e., arises 
in many relevant cases) or even universal (i.e., arises in all relevant cases), this would 
have  serious  consequences  for  the  epistemic  standing  of  both  the  aesthetic 
evaluations and the emotional responses which ground or constitute them.22 Hence, a 
intersubjectivist sentimentalist faces the difficult task to limit this possibility only to a 
few cases, that is, to a few actual instances of aesthetic merit.
If the possibility of faultless disagreement would turn out to be universal - that is, if 
22Cf. Hopkins 2000, 233 and 235, for similar, though less pessimistic worries.
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there is the possibility of the occurrence of a conflicting adequate opinion in the case 
of at least all actual occurrences of appropriate verdicts (whether they occur in the 
past, present, or future) - then we should always refrain from aesthetic judgement, 
given that we could not distinguish any more the fitting evaluations from the non-
fitting ones among the set of epistemically  appropriate responses. But this would 
have the (absurd) consequence that  we actually  would not have any adequate or 
reliable access to instances of intersubjective aesthetic values - presumably, either 
because there were none, or because our emotional responses meant to ground or 
constitute our aesthetic evaluations would not put us in proper contact with them. 
The first would mean that sentimentalism is pointless; the second, that it is false. 
Hence,  the  intersubjectivist  sentimentalist  should  deny  that  the  possibility  of  a 
conflict among epistemically appropriate evaluations holds universally.
But he should also resist the assumption of a widespread possibility - that is, of the 
possibility of a faultlessly disagreeing response with respect to at least  many of all 
the actual past, present or future occurrences of adequate aesthetic assessments. As 
I have illustrated further above, it is common for sentimentalists to maintain that, 
once  our  relevant  emotional  responses  occur  under  conditions  ensuring  the 
epistemically appropriate appreciation of objects, they do - or at least are likely to - 
ground or constitute aesthetic evaluations which are fitting, that is, indeed reflect the 
aesthetic  worth  of  the  object  concerned.  But  if  the  possibility  of  faultless 
disagreement  would  be  widespread,  there  would  be  many  justified  aesthetic 
assessments  which  are  non-fitting,  given  that  at  best  one  of  several  conflicting 
adequate evaluations could be fitting. And this would undermine the postulated link 
between epistemic appropriateness and fittingness (e.g., the truth-conduciveness of 
the former):  if  many emotional  responses would give rise  to  non-fitting aesthetic 
evaluations, despite being epistemically adequate and thus possessing the required 
justificatory potential,  they would loose their general capacity to render aesthetic 
assessments (likely to be) fitting - and, hence, their related capacity to ground or 
constitute evaluations which potentially reflect actual instances of aesthetic worth. 
The  intersubjectivist  sentimentalist  should  therefore  argue  also  against  the 
widespread possibility of faultless disagreement concerning aesthetic merit - at least 
if he is assuming that epistemic appropriateness is either constitutive of or conducive 
to fittingness.
However,  such  sentimentalists  may  still  choose  to  accept  the  possibility  of  a 
conflicting justified opinion with regard to only some actual instances of epistemically 
adequate aesthetic evaluations. Indeed, many intersubjectivist sentimentalists have 
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opted for this route (cf., e.g., Hume 1998 and Budd 1999). But, in order to avoid the 
problems outlined above, they should then also reject the further thesis that, given 
that faultless disagreement in aesthetic matters is possible in some actual cases of 
aesthetic  assessment,  it  is  also  possible  in  many  or  even  all  such  cases.  The 
sentimentalist in question can try to resist this further thesis in two ways. First, he 
can claim - with respect to the first step of the challenge outlined above - that the 
possibility  of  diverging  emotional  responses  even  under  conditions  suitable  for 
epistemic appropriateness is limited to only a few actual instances. And second, he 
can claim - with respect to the third step - that the possibility of a conflict among 
diverging, but epistemically appropriate  evaluations  is limited to only a few actual 
instances.23 I will discuss each option in turn (cf. sections 12-13 and sections 14-16, 
respectively).
The ubiquity of possible faultless divergence among emotional responses
12. The first alternative turns out to be untenable, once a closer look is taken at what 
is responsible for the possibility of a divergence among our emotional responses to 
aesthetic  objects.  A  diagnosis  of  this  form  is  not  often  provided,  even  by 
sentimentalists  who accept  the  possibility  of  differing  emotional  responses  under 
conditions which ensure the justification of the related evaluations. What is crucial 
here  is  the  middle  position  with  respect  to  rational  responsiveness  and 
determination, which emotions and emotional responses take up in relation to other 
mental episodes and states, at least if  fully rational subjects (which moreover are 
competent  in  their  use  of  concepts,  and  so  on)  are  concerned.  Sensations, 
perceptions and basic desires (such as hunger), for instance, are not responsive to 
reasons at all, even in fully rational subjects. They occur and disappear merely due to 
causal mechanisms, and independently of any reasons of which we may be aware. In 
contrast,  judgements, beliefs and instrumental desires are sensitive to reasons, at 
23A third strategy would be to accept the widespread or universal  possibility of faultless 
disagreement  relative  to  our actual  aesthetic  evaluations,  but  to  discount  its  epistemic 
significance for the latter - for instance, because this possibility is not 'real' enough, that is, 
is  too  remote  from how  things  actually  are  and  therefore  seldomly  or  never  actually 
realized. However, the relevant possibility of a difference in the intervening causal factors 
concerns typically the personalities, moods or habits of the subjects in question (cf. section 
12f. below) and should thus not count as too remote or 'unrealistic'. And moreover, even if 
the possibility would be only remote, there would presumably be the need to relativise the 
exemplifications of aesthetic values, or the truth-values of aesthetic assessments, at least in 
the distant worlds involved. But relativisation is, if at all, an essential feature of the entities 
concerned. Thus, if they would be relativised in some possible world, then they would be 
relativised in all worlds, including the actual.
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least in fully rational subjects. More specifically, in such subjects, they are formed 
solely  in  response  to  reasons;  and  no  merely  causal  factors  are  involved  in  the 
determination of their occurrence and content.24
Emotional dispositions and responses seem to be located somewhere between these 
two extremes, some perhaps closer to perceptions and the like, and others maybe 
closer  to  judgements  or  beliefs  and  the  like.  As  I  have  already  discussed,  our 
emotional responses are often responding to rational forces. We become aware of the 
danger  of  walking  near  the  edge  of  a  cliff  and  start  to  feel  frightened;  and  we 
discover that (certain) dogs are agressive and dangerous and begin to develop the 
disposition to fear them.25 But our emotional responses are in many cases only partly 
determined by reasons. Merely causal factors are also often involved, both in the 
acquisition  of  emotional  dispositions  and  in  their  manifestation  in  the  form  of 
occurrences of emotional responses - and even, as it seems, in fully rational people. 
For instance, character traits seem to be important. A generally timid person is more 
likely to develop a disposition to fear dogs than a nervy one. Habits may also become 
relevant. Having to regularly work at great heights may decrease one's tendency to 
become frightened, even though one still believes it to be dangerous each time one 
goes up. Similarly, other factors - such as associations, moods or other emotions (cf. 
Goldie  2000,  75f.)  -  may  have  such  a  merely  causal  impact  on  our  emotional 
disposition  and  responses.  But  due  to  its  non-rational  nature,  such  an  impact  is 
compatible  with  the  emotions  in  question  satisfying  the  constraints  on  their 
rationality. Hence, the many emotions, which are only partially responsive to reasons, 
may count as rational even if they are influenced by non-rational factors.
Wiggins seems to make a very similar point with respect to the possibility of two 
differing and conflicting moral verdicts, with which we may come up despite being 
"not  distinguishable  in  any  of  the  relevant  respects  such  as  the  capacities, 
obligations, commitments, etc., that deliberation can treat as fixed" (Wiggins 1987a, 
181, n. 43), and which can survive "scrutiny of everything in the circumstances and 
24I assume here that it is part of being a rational person that one forms a judgement, belief 
or desire just in case one has reason to do so, and no undercutting or overriding contrary 
reasons.  The intimate links between the formation of  judgements,  beliefs  or  desires  in 
rational subjects and their reasons for forming them have been noted and described by 
Peacocke  1992 and  Smith  1994,  among others.  Of  course,  we  may  still  come to  form 
judgements, beliefs or desires in irrational ways - for instance, when forming them partly 
or entirely due to causal factors (e.g., certain feelings, moods, or drugs). And similarly, fully 
rational subjects may still differ in their judgements, beliefs or desires, despite being aware 
of the same reasons. Such differences may concern the degree of credence, the intensity of 
longing,  the  threshold  of  when  reasons  become  compelling,  and  so  on.  Thanks  to  an 
anonymous referee for pointing this out to me.  
25I assume here that the sentimentalist will accept that the facts providing us with reasons 
for emotional responses provide us at the same time with reasons for the corresponding 
evaluations (cf. Goldie 2004 and 2007).
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scrutiny of all other deliberatively admissible facts" (ibid., 181). As he suggests, even 
if  some  (say,  causal)  difference  between  the  two  cases  is  assumed  (as  seems 
plausible), these underlying (causal) factors need not have any rational impact on our 
diverging verdicts:
Surely there must be something about case C1 that made that turn out the other 
way and differently from C2. Perhaps. Let me not quarrel here with this well-worn 
dogma. But that which explains the difference in outcome [...] need not impinge 
upon our grounds for endorsing one verdict  in C1 and the other verdict  in C2. 
(Wiggins 1987a, 181f.)
In short,  the epistemic appropriateness of  our evaluations is  a  matter  of  reasons 
alone, but our relevant emotional responses are often not. In many cases, the reasons 
underdetermine the emotional  responses.  And in  these cases,  even if  there  is  no 
difference in rational impact and hence in epistemic standing, non-rational factors 
can - and are perhaps even likely to - lead to diverging emotional responses.
13.  The sentimentalist  might  still  insist  that  cases of  emotional  responses,  which 
involve some non-rational influence, should count as inappropriate, at least according 
to the requirements for justification in aesthetic assessment. The idea would be that 
epistemic appropriateness excludes such non-rational forces and, hence, ensures - as 
in the case of judgements, beliefs or instrumental desires - convergence in rational 
response.
However, it is doubtful that  all possible kinds of merely causal influences on our 
relevant emotional responses should count as undermining the justification of the 
related aesthetic assessments. In the example of Picasso's painting, the difference 
between the various emotional responses is due to a difference in such non-rational 
forces. But it seems equally appropriate, from an aesthetic point of view, to react to 
this particular artwork with excitement, awe, or uneasiness.26 Similarly, we do not 
take all non-aesthetic emotions to be inadequate solely on the ground that they have 
been  influenced  by  our  personalities,  habits,  and  so  on.  It  seems  that  the 
sentimentalist  rejoinder  would  simply  render  too  many  emotional  responses  and 
corresponding  evaluations  -  whether  in  aesthetic  or  other  matters  -  to  be 
inappropriate.
26This  seems to  be an  instance  of  the more  general  problem -  as  it  has been noted  by 
Levinson 2002 with respect to Hume's account - to justify, from an aesthetic point of view, 
the selection of a particular set of conditions (and not another one) as those which ensure 
epistemic appropriateness in aesthetic appreciation.
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Then,  it  is  doubtful  that  non-rational  factors  have  any  significant  bearing  on 
aesthetic  appropriateness  in  the  first  place.  As  it  seems,  the  epistemic 
appropriateness  of  aesthetic  evaluations  is  -  just  like  the  epistemic  standing  of 
judgements, beliefs or instrumental  desires,  but unlike the epistemic adequacy of 
sensations, perceptions or basic desires - exclusively rational in nature, that is, solely 
a  matter  of  reasons  and  rational  considerations.  This  strict  focus  on  reasons  is 
reflected in the fact that, when asked to justify our aesthetic verdicts, we exclusively 
refer  to  features  of  the  objects  concerned  which  are  (or  which  we  take  to  be) 
aesthetically relevant reasons. And it is also illustrated by the fact that the conditions 
ensuring  the  epistemic  appropriateness  of  aesthetic  evaluations  are  traditionally 
unconcerned  with  the  exclusion  of  non-rational  influences,  and  instead  merely 
demand the correct assessment of all aesthetically relevant reasons, as well as the 
disregard of all other kinds of reasons (e.g., purely sentimental ones).27 However, if 
the epistemic appropriateness of aesthetic assessments is solely a matter of reasons, 
the presence of merely causal factors cannot undermine it, as long as it is true that 
all the rational requirements are fulfilled.
A  final  difficulty  arises  out  of  the  phenomenon  of  the  relative  cognitive 
impenetrability of our emotional responses (cf.  Goldie 2000).  Emotional responses 
are relatively cognitively impenetrable (or inert) in the sense that they often tend to 
resist  the immediate pressures of  rational  considerations.  Although our emotional 
responses are in general responsive to reasons,  this responsiveness is not always 
effective,  or  at least not directly.  Belief  in the irrationality  of a certain emotional 
responses may cause it to vanish straight away. But it is more often the case that 
emotional responses remain existent and manifest, at least for a while, even if one is 
aware of there being no good reason for their manifestation. For instance, that my 
lover has succeeded in convincing me of the fact that she is not having an affair may 
well have no (immediate) influence on my feeling jealous of the suspected competitor. 
Or my knowledge of the harmlessness of spiders need not prevent me from feeling 
fear when I am confronted with one. Again, this appears to place emotional responses 
between perceptions, sensations or basic desires, on the one hand, and judgements, 
beliefs or instrumental desires, on the other.
The relative cognitive impenetrability of emotional responses raises two particular 
problems for the sentimentalist reply under discussion. The first is to explain why it is 
possible, and common, with respect to emotions (and impossible or at least very rare 
with respect to judgements, beliefs or instrumental desires, even in subjects who are 
27This is true even of impartiality requirements, such as Kant's disinterestedness (cf. Kant 
1985, sections 2ff.)).
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not fully rational). The best explanation of this fact seems to be that there can - and 
often do - exist non-rational forces, which compete with and overcome the rational 
ones at work. When we know that something is not dangerous and still fear it, what 
happens is that the rational force of our knowledge is trumped by some causal factors 
which sustain or continue to bring about our feeling of fear. The second problem is to 
make plausible that all occurrences of cognitive impenetrability are inappropriate or 
irrational,  at  least  from  an  aesthetic  perspective.  For  if  they  are  not,  such 
occurrences  will  constitute  further  cases  of  faultlessly  disagreeing  emotional 
responses. Consider the cognitive impenetrability of perceptions. If we experience 
the Müller-Lyer illusion, but are aware of the underlying mechanisms and of the fact 
that the lines are nonetheless of the same length, it would be odd to describe us as 
irrational. Of course, our perceptual experience is mistaken. But this mistake is not of 
a rational sort. Likewise, if we are afraid of something that we know to be completely 
harmless, and if we perhaps also know why our fear persists, our response does not 
seem to be irrational either.28 In particular, even our best attempts at education or 
training need not lead to the desired responsiveness (cf. Goldie 2000, 110). Hence, it 
still  needs  to  be  motivated  that  emotional  cases  of  cognitive  impenetrability  are 
always inappropriate - and, in the relevant cases, especially from an aesthetic point of 
view.
The  conclusion  should  therefore  be  that  the  conditions  on  the  justification  of 
aesthetic  evaluations  cannot  guarantee  a  sameness  in  emotional  responses  or 
dispositions. There is always the possibility of differing responses, given that there is 
a great variety of causal factors which may become effective in the establishment of 
emotional  dispositions  or  in  their  manifestation  in  concrete  cases.  Hence,  in  the 
context  of  adequate aesthetic  assessment,  there is  likewise always,  or at  least in 
many cases, the possibility of a divergence among our emotional responses.
The ubiquity of possible faultless disagreement in aesthetic appreciation
14. But, as I mentioned above, there is a second option of resisting the further thesis 
that  the  possibility  of  faultless  disagreement  in  some  actual  cases  of  aesthetic 
assessment implies its widespread or even universal possibility. The aim is now to 
limit this possibility on the level of aesthetic evaluations, rather than on the level of 
28At least, we appear to be far less in the wrong than in the case in which we fear something 
harmless  while  taking  it  to  be  dangerous,  or  in  the  case  in  which  we fear  something 
harmless without being aware of our tendency to fear things of this kind despite their 
harmlessness (cf. Goldie 2000, 75f.). 
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emotional responses. The idea is that, even if it is accepted that for many or even all 
actual and epistemically appropriate aesthetic assessments of an object there can be 
diverging evaluations, and also that for some of these cases there is the possibility of 
a genuine conflict in assessment, it does not automatically follow that there can be 
conflicts in more than a few of the cases of divergence. And simply assuming the 
ubiquitous possibility of conflict among epistemically adequate evaluations seems to 
beg the question with respect to the sentimentalist.29 As Budd puts it:
[One can] make the exceptionally strong claim that with respect to any object and 
any aesthetic property ideal critics might faultlessly disagree, or merely that, for 
each aesthetic property, it is possible for there to be cases in which there is no 
consensus  among  ideal  critics  as  to  whether  a  certain  object  possesses  that 
property. This weaker claim might well be true. But to establish in the case of a 
particular [aesthetic value] that it is possible for there to be a set of nonevaluative 
properties suitable to be the basis of that [value] which is such that there can be 
faultless disagreements of taste among ideal critics, it would be necessary to show 
that the constraints imposed on the base properties by the nature of the aesthetic 
[value]  and  the  criteria  for  qualifying  as  an  ideal  critic  do  not  guarantee  a 
consensus in aesthetic judgements. (Budd 1999, 307).
Budd's point applies even if the proponent of the ubiquity of possible conflicts among 
justified assessments of aesthetic merit limits his claim merely to the  widespread 
possibility  of  faultlessly  disagreeing  opinions  with  respect  to  actual evaluations. 
Accordingly, the defender of the challenge to sentimentalism has to demonstrate, or 
at  least  to  render  very  plausible,  that  a  conflict  among  differing  appropriate 
assessments is possible in more than a few cases. And this can indeed be achieved. If 
the diverging evaluations are concerned with the overall aesthetic merit of the object 
in question (e.g., its being, or not being, a masterpiece), they have to be in conflict, 
simply because an object can possess only a single intersubjective overall aesthetic 
29Indeed, as has been pointed out to me by an anonymous referee, a sentimentalist might 
more generally object that what we are concerned with here is establishing merely the 
epistemic possibility of faultless disagreement, but that, for all that we know, convergence 
under optimal conditions seems as epistemically possible as divergence. But even if the 
first half of this objection is true, the burden of proof lies still with the sentimentalists, and 
for two reasons. First, they aim at positively establishing the claim that emotions can justify 
evaluations. And, as I try to argue in this essay, they can achieve this aim only if they either 
accommodate or positively rule out the metaphysical possibility of faultless disagreement, 
and not by merely casting some doubt on it. And second, in the light of our actual evidence 
about how emotions get influenced by very differing causal factors and, as a result, actually 
differ a lot, it seems much more likely that they will diverge than converge, even under the 
most optimal conditions. For the criteria for optimality concern primarily, or even solely, 
rational factors, and not causal ones (cf. section 13 above).
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value  at  a  given  time.  An  object  cannot  truly  and  simultaneously  be  both  a 
masterpiece  and  no  masterpiece.  At  best,  it  can  simultaneously  be  both  a 
masterpiece-for-me and no masterpiece-for-you, or its possession of the property of 
being  a  masterpiece  may  be  true-for-me  and  false-for-you.  Accordingly, 
intersubjective aesthetic assessments - in fact, whether they are justified or not - are 
in conflict with each other whenever they ascribe different overall values to the same 
object.
15. The intersubjectivist sentimentalist can therefore claim merely that the possibility 
of  a  conflict  among  differing,  but  justified  evaluative  responses  occurs  on  more 
specific levels of aesthetic appreciation (and even there only rarely, for that matter). 
These  levels  are  concerned  with  the  recognition  of  (often  partially  descriptive) 
aesthetic values which, although they contribute to the overall merit of their bearers, 
are either local by pertaining solely to certain parts of the objects (e.g., the beautiful 
left  panel),  or  aspectual  by  concerning  only  certain  aspects  of  the  worth  of  the 
objects (e.g., the elegance or inventiveness of its drawing).30 But due to this limitation 
of the acceptance of possible cases of faultless disagreement, sentimentalism runs 
into some serious difficulties.
First, the challenge to sentimentalism still undermines the epistemic standing of our 
aesthetic evaluations and related emotional responses if these are concerned with the 
overall assessment of objects. Given that many, if not all, of our respective responses 
occurring  under  epistemically  faultless  conditions  permit  differing  reactions,  and 
given that diverging overall evaluations have to be in conflict, there is indeed the 
widespread or even universal possibility of conflicting, but adequate assessments of 
overall  aesthetic merit.  Hence, the sentimentalist view at issue has the untenable 
consequence that we should refrain from making overall aesthetic assessments.
Second,  the number of  cases,  in which faultless disagreement about  the overall 
worth of an object is possible, is presumably large enough to threaten to undermine 
also the epistemic standing of our aesthetic evaluations and emotional responses in 
general, that is, independent of the specificity of value involved. This presupposes 
that we do not distinguish between overall and more specific assessments when we 
consider the epistemic status of our evaluations. That is, if we should refrain from 
making  the  one  kind,  we  should  also  refrain  from  making  the  other  kind  of 
assessment. Any disjunctive approach to this problem, on the other hand, would call 
30Perhaps the more specific values differ from the overall ones also in that the former, but 
not the latter, are merely prima facie and open to be overridden or undermined by other 
more specific values of their bearer (cf. Goldie 2007 for a very similar distinction).
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into question our epistemic practice of deriving overall  values from more specific 
ones,  possibly rendering the former unknowable.  And it  would cast  doubt on the 
classification of both as values of broadly the same kind (i.e., as aesthetic).
Third, the claim that most diverging (appropriate) aesthetic assessments on a more 
specific  level  are  not  in  conflict  seems implausible.  Considering again  Goldman's 
example, the aesthetic values of being graceful and insipid do not merely seem to 
differ, but also to be incompatible with each other (if only in the descriptive aspects 
of these evaluative properties). As it appears, a painting - or some part of it - cannot 
be graceful and insipid at the same time. And many other more specific aesthetic 
values - such as being gaudy and calm, or balanced and unsteady - seem to stand in 
similar  conflicts  with  each  other.  Hence,  it  appears  likely  that  many  (adequate) 
aesthetic evaluations are incompatible, despite not concerning the overall merit of an 
object.
And fourth, the sentimentalist would still have to provide an account of the fact that 
we so often take our evaluations to be in conflict with each other, even at the level of 
local or aspectual values. We do think that many of our respective assessments are in 
conflict,  and  that  there  is  a  genuine  need  to  settle  the  dispute.  For  instance,  if 
someone takes a painting to be insipid which we take to be graceful,  we tend to 
answer back and try to  convince him of  our opinion,  or at  least  to  bring him to 
disclose the reasons for his assessment. And if we cannot find any fault with any of 
the diverging responses, even after long and detailed scrutiny and discussion, and 
therefore eventually stop arguing, this happens usually simply because we do not 
know  what  to  say  any  more,  and  not  because  we  cease  to  think  that  there  is 
something to argue about.
16. One interesting reply to this, as well as to the more general issue of how to deal 
with  the  seemingly  possible  conflicts  among  justified  aesthetic  evaluations,  is  to 
maintain that all what the possibility of differing evaluative responses shows is that 
we may not all have the same access to aesthetic values. The lack of intersubjectivity 
would thus turn out to be merely epistemological. This might perhaps be how Hume 
understands the seemingly subjective elements which he (perhaps a bit surprisingly) 
introduces into in his account:31
31Thanks to Mike Martin for making me aware of this way of understanding Hume. According 
to a different reading, suggested to me by an anonymous referee, Hume may not intend to 
say here that differences in age and culture influence the aesthetic values of works (or our 
responses  which  determine  these  values),  but  instead  that  they  influence  only  our  - 
presumably more personal practical - subjective preferences among the works with high 
aesthetic merit (e.g., whether we prefer masterpieces of romantic or of didactic poetry). If 
this  alternative  interpretation  is  right,  Hume's  position  does  not  involve  any  kind  of 
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A  young  man,  whose  passions  are  warm,  will  be  more  sensibly  touched  with 
amorous  and  tender  images,  than  a  man  more  advanced  in  years,  who  takes 
pleasure  in  wise,  philosophical  reflections  concerning  the  conduct  of  life  and 
moderation of the passions. At twenty, Ovid may be the favourite author; Horace at 
forty; and perhaps  Tacitus at fifty. Vainly would we, in such cases, endeavour to 
enter into the sentiments of  others,  and divest  ourselves of  those propensities, 
which are natural to us. (cf. Hume 1998, 150)
Perhaps there are indeed certain limits on which aesthetic value we can recognize at 
various stages of our life or development; and perhaps these limits are connected to 
the  fact  that  our  emotional  dispositions  are  partly  determined  by  factors,  which 
uniquely pertain to each of those stages, and which inevitably change over time in 
conjunction with the related dispositions. This would mean that we would not always 
have, nor could acquire, the emotional dispositions required for the recognition of the 
overall aesthetic merit of certain objects, or of the more specific values contributing 
to this  overall  worth.  For  instance,  the young may yet  not  be able  to  appreciate 
Tacitus, because the latter's writings leave him generally cold, or because he cannot 
grasp all the relevant specific merits of these writings. 
But  this  epistemological  approach  to  the  divergence  among  our  evaluative 
responses faces at least two serious problems. The first difficulty is that it does not 
seem to apply easily to cases in which there are two competing responses, rather 
than one response and an absence of one. What if the young is not left indifferent by 
reading Tacitus, but is bored by him, or even annoyed? If this would mean that he has 
access to a different overall aesthetic value than the old who enjoys the writings, 
then one of the two would have to be in the wrong, given that the works can posses 
only a single overall value. But there would be no epistemic reason to prefer one 
response over the other. If, on the other hand, the young's assessment would concern 
merely a different more specific value than that of the old, at least one of the two - 
presumably  the  young  -  would  not  have  access  to  the  overall  value  of  Tacitus' 
writings. For he would not have access to the more specific values which are only 
seen by the old, but which nonetheless contribute to the overall merit. And we would 
perhaps  be happy to say that  the young gets  the overall  value of  Tacitus'  works 
wrong; but not that he cannot even assess it. The second problem is that, to cover all 
cases of possible faultless disagreement, it would presumably have to be assumed 
relativisation to age or culture, but still faces the challenge to sentimentalism outlined in 
this essay.
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that there are many aesthetic values (whether more specific or not) to which we do 
not have access at a given time in our life or development. But this would again, and 
again absurdly, mean that we would not have access to the overall merit of many 
works.
17.  Besides,  there  is  a  further  and  independent  problem  for  any  sentimentalist 
position which assumes the possibility of faultless disagreement in certain, but not all 
cases:  namely  to  answer  the  difficult  question  of  which  feature  of  us,  or  of  the 
respective  situations,  or  of  the  aesthetic  values  involved,  is  responsible  for  this 
restriction to certain cases.  As it  stands, it  seems arbitrary that the possibility of 
faultless disagreement arises in certain cases - in which we should then refrain from 
aesthetic judgement - but not in others. As long as no satisfactory explanation of this 
postulated fact is provided, it seems more appropriate to allow for this possibility in 
all cases, if in any at all.
As a consequence, a sentimentalist should admit that, if faultless disagreement is 
possible in some actual cases of aesthetic assessments, than it  is also possible in 
many or even all actual cases. Hence, to avoid the ubiquity of the need to refrain 
from aesthetic assessment, he should either give up intersubjectivism, or deny the 
possibility of faultless disagreement altogether.
Denying the possibility of faultless disagreement
18.  Sentimentalist  can deny the  possibility  of  faultless  disagreement  and thereby 
reject the raised challenge as misguided in various ways. The traditional approach 
has been to undermine the first step of this challenge by arguing that there is no 
emotional divergence under suitable conditions. According to the Kantian approach 
(cf. Kant 1990, sections 20ff. and 36ff.), we all possess - presumably from birth on 
and as part of our common human nature - the same affective disposition to react 
with  pleasure or  displeasure,  at  least  with  respect  to  those responses  which are 
relevant for aesthetic appreciation (i.e., we all possess the same 'taste'). The Humean 
approach (cf. Hume 1998), on the other hand, maintains that we may and usually do 
possess different relevant emotional dispositions, but that, under suitable conditions, 
the same dispositions will  develop and become effective in all  of us. The idea (or 
hope) is that raising the standards for the appropriateness of aesthetic evaluations 
will lead to a convergence among those emotional responses and verdicts living up to 
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these standards. However, it is nowadays widely accepted that both approaches are 
bound to fail (cf., e.g., Budd 1995, ch. 1, Goldman 1995, 26ff., Zangwill 2001, ch. 9, 
and Levinson 2002). And their failure seems to be due, at least to a considerable 
extent, to the fact that our emotional responses are partly beyond rational influence, 
while the epistemic standards governing our aesthetic assessments do not concern 
non-rational, that is, merely causal factors (cf. section 13).
19.  A  different  and  more  recent  attempt  to  deny  the  possibility  of  faultless 
disagreement  has  been  to  question  the  second  step  of  the  challenge  to 
sentimentalism by denying that the possibility of diverging emotional responses even 
under  conditions  suitable  for  epistemic  appropriateness  transfers  to  the  related 
evaluations.32 This amounts in fact to a denial of the possibility of differing aesthetic 
evaluations under those conditions. Budd suggests two ways in which this may be 
achieved.  He  describes  the  first  in  the  following  manner,  treating  evaluative 
properties here as dispositional:
If [...] crediting an object with the dispositional property only if it is such as to 
elicit the response from all the qualified viewers, [...] the absence of uniformity of 
response  will  imply  that  the  object  does  not  possess  the  aesthetic  property  in 
question.(Budd 1999, 306)
The  central  idea  is  to  add  a  further  condition  necessary  for  epistemic 
appropriateness, in addition to the more substantial requirements already noted (i.e., 
the demands for full information, attentiveness, sensitivity, impartiality, experience, 
and  so  on).  And  this  further  condition  states  that  an  aesthetic  evaluation  is 
appropriate only if there is - or, alternatively, can be - no differing assessment when 
the  more  substantial  conditions  are  satisfied.  Budd  seems  to  prefer  the  reading 
according to which only the actual occurrence of a second and faultlessly disagreeing 
evaluation would undermine the justification of the originally given assessment. But 
this does not help to undermine the possibility of faultless disagreement in cases in 
which  a  given  adequate  opinion  is  not  actually  confronted  with  a  faultlessly 
conflicting  verdict.  For  the  fact  that  the  latter  does  not  actually  occur  does  not 
32If the emotional responses are taken to be constituents, and the sole constituents, of the 
evaluations, the second approach becomes very similar to the first. Besides, another way of 
undermining the possibility of faultless conflict among various aesthetic evaluations is to 
reject the third step of the challenge to sentimentalism by denying that such assessments 
are ever in conflict with each other. But for the reasons already rehearsed in sections 14-16 
above, this strategy is bound to fail with respect to ascriptions of both overall aesthetic 
values and more specific ones. See also footnote 27 for the discussion of a fourth way of 
trying to undermine the possibility of faultless disagreement.
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undermine its possibility. Hence, in this reading, the additional condition, together 
with the initial, more substantial set, does not suffice to rule out the possibility of 
faultless  disagreement.  But  the  other  reading,  according  to  which  already  the 
possible occurrence of another faultless, but conflicting evaluation would undermine 
the epistemic standing of the original assessment, does not fare better. For it would 
lead to a needlessly sceptical view on our ability to gain justified access to instances 
of aesthetic values, unless the possibility of faultless disagreement under the initial, 
more substantial conditions (without the newly added one) can be limited to a few 
cases.  For  if  this  possibility  would be widespread,  the additional  condition would 
classify all the respective (and otherwise possibly adequate) aesthetic assessments as 
unjustified.
20.  Now,  Budd  presents  a  second  way  in  which  the  possibility  of  faultless 
disagreement among aesthetic assessments can be denied:
The second is to understand a judgement that ascribes [an aesthetic value] to a 
work as making no reference to ideal viewers but rather as claiming that the work 
uniquely merits a certain response, so that the response is the right response. [...] 
In fact, the second of the two strategies would appear to be more plausible. [...] 
Accordingly, a response-dependent account of judgements that ascribe [aesthetic 
values] should represent the content of such a judgement as being that the item to 
which the property is ascribed is such that the evaluative response integral to the 
property is the appropriate response to the item, the judgement being true if and 
only if any competing response is indicative of a defect in a person who responds 
to the item in that manner or an inadequacy in the person's engagement with the 
item. (Budd 1999, 307f.)
What Budd proposes is that certain evaluative responses are appropriate, but others 
not,  because  only  the  former  are  rendered adequate  by  the  actual  values  of  the 
objects  concerned.  And  aesthetic  values  render  appropriate  precisely  those 
evaluations  which  stand  in  a  correspondance  relation  to  them  -  where  the 
correspondance presumably consists in the fact that the values have to be elucidated 
in terms of the responses in question, and that the responses assign these values to 
the objects at which they are directed. This suggests that evaluative responses are 
appropriate only if their objects actually exemplify the corresponding values, and that 
what  is  at  issue is  therefore the fittingness of  aesthetic  assessments.  Hence,  the 
actual  presence of  the value is  a  condition on fittingness,  but not  necessarily  on 
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epistemic  appropriateness.  On the  other  hand,  Budd's  proposal  involves  also  the 
claim  that  the  exemplified  values  merit  or  justify  the  corresponding  evaluative 
responses. And this suggests that what is at issue is the epistemic appropriateness of 
aesthetic assessments. This duality in the proposal remains unproblematic only if an 
account  of  aesthetic  appreciation  is  endorsed  which  claims  that  epistemic 
appropriateness  coincides  with  fittingness.  Hence,  Budd  probably  has  (or  should 
have) such a position in mind.33
But in any case, his second proposal turns out to be very similar to the first in that it 
likewise involves the key claim that the satisfaction of the conditions on epistemic 
appropriateness  by  more  than  one  conflicting  evaluation  renders  all  of  them 
unjustified. The difference between the two proposals concerns the issue of which 
factors are relevant for epistemic adequacy - the satisfaction of the original, more 
substantial conditions in the first case, or the presence of a justifying link between 
the exemplified value and the response in the second. But this means also that the 
second proposal faces, basically, the same difficulties as the first.
Conclusion
21.  What  the  preceding  considerations  have  been  intended  to  illustrate  is  that 
intersubjectivist  sentimentalists  can neither  hope to  be  able  to  accommodate the 
possibility of faultless disagreement, nor hope to be able to undermine this possibility. 
The conclusion is that sentimentalists, in response to the challenge to their position, 
should simply reject  intersubjectivism (and thereby reject  the second step of  this 
challenge).  However,  in  the  light  of  the  potential  unattractiveness  of  giving  up 
intersubjectivism, it is perhaps better to understand this conclusion as a motivation 
to  reject  the  view that  sentimentalism may provide a  satisfactory  account  of  the 
epistemology of aesthetic appreciation, and to begin to search for a more promising 
33Budd's second proposal has also some affinities to accounts which do not take epistemic 
appropriateness to be always sufficient for fittingness. The proposal appears to replace the 
verdicts of ideal judges (i.e., our epistemically best opinions) with the actually exemplified 
values as determinants of the standard for the appropriateness of aesthetic evaluations. 
This suggests a shift from projected values to ones which are cognizable as proper parts of 
reality. Indeed, Budd may seem to have adopted the talk of 'objects meriting responses' 
straight from defenders of a substantial notion of truth which is not reducible to epistemic 
appropriateness  (cf.  McDowell  1983  and  1985,  and  Wiggins  1987b).  But  perhaps  this 
ambiguity in how to understand Budd's second proposal just illustrates that both it and 
McDowell's and Wiggins' positions resist the usual classifications - or, more pessimistically 
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